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After 1989, radical changes in the level of entrepreneurial activity have taken place in the 
Central and East European (CEE) region countries, transitioning from the communist to a 
market economy system. In this paper we explore these developments at the macro level of 
countries. In particular, we investigate developments in business ownership rates in four CEE 
transition economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) in the period 
1989-2008, and compare them with developments in other OECD countries. To this end we 
make use of EIM’s COMPENDIA data base, which contains harmonized data on the number 
of  business  owners  in  OECD  countries.  Data  for  the  four  CEE  region  countries  under 
consideration have recently been added to COMPENDIA. Our analysis reveals that, since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, business ownership rates in the four CEE countries have been 
converging  rapidly  towards  the  levels  of  other  OECD  countries,  and  more  specifically, 
Western European countries. This shows that the communist system did not have prolonged 
negative effects on the private business sector in these four countries. Instead, based on their 
institutional and cultural roots, or ‘civilization fundamentals’, these CEE countries were able 
to rebuild the entrepreneurial sector in a relatively short period of transition. Finally, in spite 
of the general trend of convergence towards Western European countries, we also find sizable 
differences  among  these  four  CEE  countries  in  the  level  and  development  of  business 
ownership since 1989. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the different developments of business ownership (BO) rates over 
the  period  1989-2008 in  four  Central  and East  European  (CEE)  countries: the  Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland, against similar trends observed in 
other  OECD  countries  during  the  same  period.  Understanding  country  differences  in 
entrepreneurship is important because entrepreneurship is widely believed to play a key 
role in economic development (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004, 2010). Such understanding 
is  particularly  relevant  in  countries  undergoing  systemic  transformation  from  the 
centrally-planned  or  communist  to  a  market  economy  system.  Immediately  after  the 
Second  World  War,  the  Central  European  countries  under  study  fell  under  Soviet 
dominance which lasted until 1989-1990. During 45 years private business ownership 
was disallowed or barely tolerated as a marginal, unimportant addition to a dominating 
state-owned  sector.  Within  the  official  paradigm  of  the  socio-economic  development 
under  communism  there  was  no  room  for  entrepreneurship  as  a  potential  factor 
contributing to such development.  
 
The  situation  has  changed  dramatically  after  1989,  when  the  communist  system 
collapsed, and the transition towards a market economy system was initiated. Obviously, 
entrepreneurs  played  an  important  role  in  this  process  reflected  in  the  explosion  of 
entrepreneurial  initiatives  in  the  CEE  region,  particularly  during  the  1990s.  These 
developments have attracted considerable attention among entrepreneurship researchers. 
The vast majority of this research focused on how individual entrepreneurs cope with 
the opportunities, threats and challenges within a particular transition context being still 
affected  by  the  inheritance  from  the  communist  past  and  characterized  by  mounting 
barriers and obstacles resulting from a weak institutional base during the early phase of 
implementing the free market system (Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Peng, 2001; Doern, 
2009; Van der Zwan, Verheul and Thurik, 2011). Most recent research acknowledges the 
heterogeneity of entrepreneurial responses to institutional conditions and the fact that 
entrepreneurs may also influence change (Welter and Smallbone, 2011). An interesting 
direction of this debate is related to the “homo sovieticus” mindset developed by several 
generations of population living under communism (Zinovyev, 1986), which is reflected, 
inter  alia,  in  the  lack  of  individual  initiative,  overreliance  on  the  state  and  passive, 
obedient acceptance of the rules imposed by the government authorities. The important     
question in this debate is to what extent such mindset affected entrepreneurial attitudes, 
once the communist-type regimes collapsed and the basic institutions of the free market 
capitalist system were introduced after 1989 (Shiller, Boycko and Korobov, 1992). 
 
However, research focusing on the macro-economic consequences of the collapse of the 
communist  system  has  been  scarce.  In  particular,  until  recently,  a  lack  of  reliable 
empirical data on the number of entrepreneurs at the country level impeded exploration 
of  developments in  entrepreneurial  activity  in transition  countries. Since many  years, 
EIM Business and Policy Research in The Netherlands maintains an international data 
base with self-employment (business ownership) numbers for 23 OECD countries that 
are comparable across countries (Van Stel, 2005). The data base contains harmonized 
data  since  1972,  and  is  updated  every  year.  The  original  23  countries  are  the  15 
countries of the (former) European Union plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the United 
States,  Japan,  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  Recently  the  data  base  has  been 
extended  with  time  series  for  seven  additional  countries,  namely  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey (Van Stel, Cieslik, and 
Hartog, 2010). 
 
The  extension  of  the  COMPENDIA  data  base  has  paved  the  way  for  longitudinal 
analysis  of  the  business  ownership  (BO)  rates,  covering  20  years  during  the  period 
1989-2008, in four transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, 
Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovak  Republic.  These  countries  share  historic  and  cultural 
traditions due to long term links with the Western civilization but also the experiences 
of 45  years under the communist regime (1945 – 1989). In this paper we investigate 
developments in business ownership rates in these four CEE transition economies in the 
period 1989-2008, and compare them with developments in other OECD countries. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  second  section  we  conduct  a 
literature  review  with  the  purpose  to  identify  key  factors  affecting  the  levels  and 
changes in BO rates of the four countries under study (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovak Republic). Based on this review we formulate seven hypotheses for further 
testing. These hypotheses mainly focus on the question whether convergence may have 
occurred  between  BO  rates  of  the  four  CEE  countries  and  those  of  other  OECD 
countries. The hypotheses also focus on differences among these four countries. Next, in     
the  third  section,  we  discuss  our  data  base  with  harmonized  data  on  the  number  of 
business owners across OECD countries over a long range of years. In section four we 
present business ownership data for OECD member countries with particular focus as 
how  the  new  CEE  countries  fit  within  general  patterns  of  business  ownership  in  the 
OECD during 1989 – 2008. The results are discussed in the fifth section in the context 
of  seven  hypotheses  being  formulated.  In  the  final  section  we  discuss  some  policy 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
2.1. Scope of literature review 
In this section we make an attempt, based on a literature review, to identify key factors 
affecting the levels and trends in business ownership rates over time in four Central and East 
European (CEE) transition economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. The first group of factors is related to the historic roots and cultural traditions. Over 
many centuries these four nations have developed strong ties with the Western civilization. In 
the last 100 years, all of them gained independence after World War I and, after a short period 
of building the fundamentals of modern states during 1918-1939, fell under Nazi occupation 
and later Soviet dominance, which ended only in 1989.  
 
The second group of factors relates to the experiences of the four countries under study with 
respect to the private business sector under communism. Despite the fact that general 
principles of the command-type economy were quite universal and driven by the ideological 
motivations, there were notable differences as to the extent the non-state-owned business 
sector and individual initiatives were tolerated and controlled.  
 
Thirdly we take into consideration the level of economic development and the growth of GDP 
in the four CEE countries during 1989 – 2008. The relationship between economic 
development and entrepreneurial activity is vividly discussed in the literature (e.g. Acs, 
Audretsch and Evans, 1994; Carree et al., 2002, 2007; Wennekers et al., 2010). On the other 
hand there are sizeable differences in the level of socio-economic development among the 
four countries under study. Finally, we examine the speed of implementation of market     
oriented reforms in these countries after 1989, with particular reference to those shaping the 
institutional environment for private business initiatives. 
 
2.2. Historic and cultural roots  
Within the new institutional economic analytical framework, there are several levels of 
institutions, the highest of which is that of informal, institutionalized rules shaped over the 
centuries, including norms, customs, traditions and religions (Williamson, 2000). Winiecki 
(2004) adapted this framework to the analysis of conditions that affected transition success 
from the communist to the free market system. According to Winiecki, what played a decisive 
role in the rapid development of the new private sector under transition was not so much the 
communist legacy as the pre-communist legacy, which he called “civilization fundamentals.” 
Therefore, it is useful to determine how close the informal rules that existed before 
communism were to the kind of institutional environment necessary to the efficient 
functioning of the free market system that emerged after the communist break-up. The 
informal rules that shape civilization fundamentals include freedom of entrepreneurship, 
perception of the general need for law and order, and generalized trust. To develop his 
argument, Winiecki pointed out that practically all successful transition economies in Europe 
were those that belonged historically to Western Christendom, whereas the “laggards” fell 
outside the eastern borders of Christianity.  
 
The arguments raised by Winiecki are powerful as they pertain to the differences between 
Poland and Russia, the example the author used. However, they are of limited use in 
explaining the differences among the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland 
because these countries all fall within the historic borders of Western Christendom. Still, by 
taking into account the variations in their civilization fundamentals, one may point to 
particular historic institutional traditions that could explain the phenomenon of Czech 
entrepreneurship revival. Benacek (1995) stressed the role of the Czech Protestant traditions, 
which date back to the 1780s, and to the proliferation of liberal and cosmopolitan ideas in the 
19
th century. These factors, combined with the very high level of industrial development in 
the area, provide a fruitful historic base on which Czech entrepreneurship could regain its 
strength after the 45 “lost” years under Soviet dominance. 
     
A similar argument based on the pre-communist legacy concept can be developed with 
respect to the formal rules, particularly the legal framework for starting and running a 
business. Here we may refer to the concept of legal origin developed by La Porta et al. (1999), 
who distinguished between the traditions of common law and civil law, where common law is 
typically associated with less government inclination to intervene in the economy and, 
therefore, greater favorability for entrepreneurship.  
 
The original concept (La Porta et al., 1999) identified within the civil law tradition a socialist 
legal system that prevailed in the communist economies. However, following widespread 
criticism, this sub-category was eliminated in the most recent formulation (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). What seems especially important, however, is the level of pre-
communist maturity of the legal system, particularly whether regulations that affect business 
operations were established before World War II. All four countries under study managed to 
shape the basics of business law during their short period of independence from 1918 to 1939. 
Although it does not seem to be useful in explaining differences in the levels of business 
ownership rates among the four countries, this legal maturity had a practical impact during the 
early days of transition because the necessary laws could be quickly restored and/or updated. 
For example, the sophisticated Polish Commercial Code of 1934 was not cancelled under 
communism, even though most of its regulations were not compatible with the centrally 
planned system. Under the new circumstances after the fall of communism, the Code was 
found to be extremely useful, especially for setting up limited liability companies, which 
became the most popular business vehicles for setting up larger domestic operations and 
subsidiaries of foreign companies.  
Based on the above analysis we may formulate three hypotheses: 
 
H1: As all four countries under study belonged historically to the Western Christendom, this 
facilitated rapid catching-up of BO rates with those prevailing in the mature market 
economies while at the same time downplaying the role of communist heritage. 
 
H2: Due to historic and cultural links with some Western European countries, BO rates 
prevailing in these countries form a “historic benchmark” to which CEE region tended to 
converge. 
     
H3: Among the CEE countries under study the historic roots of the Czech Republic provided 
the most favorable environment for catching up with respect to BO rates. 
 
 
2.3. Experiences with entrepreneurship under communism 
The experiences with entrepreneurship under communism varied significantly among the four 
countries under study. The private sector was practically liquidated in Czechoslovakia by the 
mid-1960s, whereas it was allowed to exist as a “marginal addition” to the dominating state-
owned sector in Hungary and in Poland. The relevant policies in both countries were 
implemented in waves, with periods of greater flexibility interspersed with tightened 
measures aimed at curbing the size and the “excessive richness” of the private business 
owners. In the case of Poland, an important additional factor was that foreign travel was much 
less restricted than it was in the other three countries. Therefore, many Poles -particularly the 
young- had exposure to the free market system from working abroad (often illegally) and 
(particularly in the 1980s) from the chance to engage in “individual international trade” 
(Johnson and Loveman, 1995, p. 232). 
 
In view of these developments, one may argue that Hungary and Poland were much better 
prepared for the “entrepreneurial take-off” in 1989 than the Czech and Slovak Republics 
were. First, at the verge of the systemic transition, Hungary and Poland had many individuals 
with at least some experience in starting and running small private business, albeit in the very 
peculiar and restrictive environment of a centrally planned economy. Second, these businesses 
were firmly legal with clearly defined rules on registration requirements, tax obligations, 
restrictions as to the scope of activities, maximum number of employees, and so on. This 
observation contradicts the prevailing approach (e.g., Peng 2001), which has pointed to the 
“gray” underground character of the private sector under communism. While this character 
may have applied in the former Soviet Union, it definitely did not in Hungary and Poland. 
Third, some formal regulations designed specifically for the private sector could be easily 
adapted to the new market-economy environment. For example, the simplified tax scheme for 
small-scale craft activities currently in use in Poland relies heavily on regulations introduced 
in the 1980s. 
 
However, there were important negative implications of the “communist embeddedness” of 
the incumbent private sector in Hungary and Poland, particularly the business skills, attitudes,      
ethical and moral standards and operating routines developed while conducting business 
under communism that became obsolete impediments when the rules changed. The lack of 
customer focus serves as a good example here; under communism, clients were generally not 
looked after because of the acute shortage of consumer goods and services, so customers 
waited in lines and got what they got. The major concern of the private business owners 
operating within the “shortage economy” was getting access, often through informal and/or 
illegal arrangements, to various production inputs, materials, and components—not customer 
service. As a result, they were ill-equipped to operate within a market environment where the 
crucial success factor related to building a strong client base. 
 
Since the communist authorities in Hungary and Poland often switched between flexible 
policies toward the private sector to tightened measures, the private sector in both countries 
followed a “low profile” strategy to survive the instability. This strategy was reflected in 
deliberate avoidance of demonstrations of excessive richness but also in limited market 
visibility. This strategy obviously contrasts with the proactive, dynamic orientation required 
when operating within a free-market environment.  
 
While the extant transition literature has focused on the impact of rapidly changing conditions 
on the survival of the state-owned enterprises, in fact the “transition shock” also brought 
similar challenges to the incumbent private sector (Winiecki, 2004), as exemplified by the 
words of an incumbent entrepreneur: “In 1989 Poland changed to such an extent that, in 
order to continue my prosperous business, I had to start de novo. The same business, in a 
different environment, became a new kind of activity” (Osborn and Slomczynski, 2005, p. 88). 
 
Some empirical data has suggested that the overall balance of already being in business at the 
time of transition, on the one hand, and “communist embeddedness,” on the other, was not 
positive for the incumbent private sector and that it was the newly established entrepreneurial 
firms that were the key driving force of the transition process. For example, Cieslik and 
Kaciak (2009a) found that the incumbent private sector was only marginally engaged in the 
advanced forms of entrepreneurship, namely exporting; in 2003, among approximately 50,000 
exporters, only 1,200 private firms were established before 1989 and they provided only 4% 
of the Polish commodity exports. At the same time, 40,500 domestic exporting firms 
established after 1988 contributed 32% of the export volume (54% of export volume was 
generated by 7,100 foreign subsidiaries and 10% by 1,200 state-owned enterprises). This      
paucity of pre-1989 exporters is surprising, given that many Poles were engaged in individual 
(informal) international trade, particularly in the 1980s, and the income derived from such 
operations helped to build a capital base for setting up many genuine private businesses after 
the collapse of the communist system. 
The above analysis leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Experiences with entrepreneurship under the communist regime in Hungary and Poland 
contributed to the accelerated growth of BO rates after transition. However, this contribution 
is moderated by the fact that the private sector before 1989 was deeply rooted in the 
communist environment and consequently the experiences accumulated were not always 
useful within a market economy system. 
 
2.4. Level of economic development and the growth of GDP after transition 
The complex relationship between entrepreneurship and the level of economic development 
has been subject to considerable debate in the extant literature (for an overview, see 
Wennekers et al., 2010). For instance, rising per capita income tends to go together with 
rising real wages (Lucas, 1978), implying increasing opportunity costs of self-employment 
and hence a negative relation between entrepreneurship and the level of economic 
development. On the other hand, the importance of services (niche) markets and a higher 
preference towards autonomy in highly developed economies suggest a positive relation.  
 
Data from the four CEE countries (Figure 1) show considerable differences in their GDP per 
capita in the early 1990s, particularly between the most industrialized of the four, the Czech 
Republic and the least developed Poland (Czech income per capita was almost double that of 
Poland in 1992). During 1992-2008 all four countries experienced growth in GDP per capita, 
but the pace of growth was much faster in the countries with a lower base: Poland and 
Slovakia. In fact, the growth of GDP achieved in Slovakia was remarkable and, as a result, 
Slovakia surpassed Hungary in GDP per capita in 2007. Consequently, the distance between 
the highest (Czech Republic) and the lowest (Poland) GDP per capita shrank from 46% in 
1992 to 30% in 2008.  
 
At the same time there was a clear trend in narrowing the gap as to the GDP per capita 
between the four CEE countries under study and the remaining OECD members. Whereas in 
the early 1990s the average GDP per capita in this region represented only 35 % of the      
COMPENDIA-23 average, by 2008 this ratio increased to 51% (see Figure 1).
1 This in turn 
led to gradual transition of this region from the manufacturing-based, efficiency-driven to the 
innovation-driven development stage. Following the classification of stages of development 
put forward by the World Economic Forum (Schwab, 2009), both the Czech and Slovak 
Republics have been categorized as innovation-driven economies, whereas Hungary and 
Poland have been classified as being in transition from efficiency-driven to innovation-driven. 
One may reasonably expect that within 10-15 years all four CEE countries will reach the 
innovation-driven stage, following the path of mature Western economies. While an 
innovation-driven economy is associated with many entrepreneurs trying to commercialize 
new innovative ideas in the market, in efficiency-driven economies the exploitation of 
economies of scale by large firms plays a more dominant role and there is typically less room 
for small-scaled entrepreneurship.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The above literature review and data presented lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H5: The narrowing gap as to the level of GDP per capita between mature market economies 
and CEE countries during 1989-2008 contributed to the convergence of BO rates between 
these two groups of countries. 
 
 
H6: The relatively high level of economic development in the Czech Republic contributed 
positively to bridging the gap in BO rates with the mature economies. 
 
2.5. The speed of market oriented reforms  
The impact of the speed and magnitude of macro-economic reforms can be studied from the 
perspective of the individual decision to start a business and/or from the perspective of how 
the reforms affected the growth of the private sector in general. The research conducted by 
Smallbone and Welter (2001) on a number of transition economies in the 1990s demonstrated 
that the need for independence and autonomy was by far the most common reason for starting 
a business in these countries. Clearly, the radically changing external environment, 
                                                 
1 The COMPENDIA-23 countries are those originally included in EIM’s COMPENDIA data base. The group includes the 
first 20 countries listed in Table 1 of this paper (i.e. excluding the CEE countries), and Luxembourg, Iceland and Japan (Van 
Stel, Cieslik and Hartog, 2010).      
particularly the quick dismantling of the state-owned sector, could prompt such individual 
decisions. To account for the transition-specific factors in a person’s considering 
entrepreneurship as a life-path option, Cieslik and Kaciak (2009a) adopted Shapero’s model 
of an entrepreneurial event (Shapero and Sokol, 1982). The “systemic displacement” in the 
model reflects the negative emotions invoked by working in highly bureaucratic state-owned 
enterprises, government or municipality organizations with very limited opportunities to 
demonstrate initiative. The model’s “between systems” effect encompasses the overall feeling 
that the communist system has collapsed irreversibly and the new era has begun. At the same 
time, the numerous businesses being started by former colleagues from work, friends and 
relatives creates a “positive pull” through demonstration effects, prompting similar decisions 
to start businesses by people with no previous experience or relevant family backgrounds.  
 
The research on drivers of engaging in entrepreneurial activity during the early stages of 
systemic transformation, points to the complexity of motivations, reflecting typically the 
mixture of economic, societal and psychological factors. This challenges the appropriateness 
of some theoretical concepts in the extant literature, which are based on “crude dichotomy” 
(Smallbone and Welter 2009, pp. 44-47). We have particularly in mind the distinction 
between proprietorship and entrepreneurship introduced by Scase (2003) or the much more 
widely recognized distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship, adopted in 
the GEM Project (Reynolds et al. 2002). 
 
With respect to the magnitude and speed of major macro-economic reforms that paved the 
way for the market-based economy, Poland emerged as the clear leader among transition 
economies in the CEE region. As early as 1990, Poland put in force a set of radical regulatory 
changes that introduced free-market mechanisms and eliminated protective measures for the 
state-owned sector. In other countries—Hungary and then the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic (CSFR)—the respective reforms were introduced more gradually.  
 
The empirical data that demonstrates the significant increase of new entrepreneurial start-ups 
in Poland during 1989-1992 seems to support the argument that the “shock therapy” during 
the initial phase of systemic transition was an important factor in the formation of the new 
private sector. However, there were similar trends during this period in other CEE countries, 
particularly the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the overall pace of systemic      
transformation was much slower at that time, suggesting that there were other important 
factors contributing to the expansion of the private sector. 
 
The effectiveness of the “shock therapy” versus that of gradual transition has been the subject 
of a vivid economic and political debate, particularly in Poland, with strong voices of 
criticism pointing out the unnecessary hardships of the shock therapy, particularly for the 
employees of the state-controlled sector (e.g., Kolodko, 2000). Johnson and Loveman (1995) 
argued that, from the perspective of the new private sector, the overall impact of the shock 
therapy was positive because it shaped the macro-economic conditions that were necessary 
for accelerated growth. However, based on the comparative analysis of specific policy 
measures related to the development of the small business sector in Hungary and Poland, 
Fogel and Zapalska (2001) found “no evidence on the appropriateness of macro-economic 
policies to suggest that slower or more gradual policies have overall a greater positive effect 
on SME development and entrepreneurial growth” (p. 50). One possible explanation might be 
the bi-directional impact of the speed of market oriented reforms on SME sector. On the one 
hand, speedy reforms led to the quick elimination of laws and regulations embedded in the 
communist past. At the same time, however, new regulations have been introduced in a hectic 
way, following a trial and error approach. Adaptation to frequent changes in regulations 
(including tax codes) during the early days of transition was time-consuming and costly, 
particularly for smaller firms. 
 
Similarly inconclusive findings result from analyzing the impact of the overall business 
climate, particularly the impact of the ease of doing business on business ownership. Using 
the aggregated World Bank index as a measure of the ease of doing business in 2009 (World 
Bank, 2009), at the bottom of the list were both the Czech Republic and Poland, as the most 
heavily regulated of EU countries, with the exception of Italy and Greece. Slovakia and 
Hungary, ranked in the middle of the list. Thus, the rankings of the four countries in terms of 
ease of doing business do not correspond with the rankings based on the level of business 
ownership. This conclusion does not necessarily reflect transition-specific conditions but 
reinforces a more general argument raised by Van Stel, Storey and Thurik (2007) regarding 
the rather insignificant impact of administrative considerations on the level of entrepreneurial 
activity. 
 
The above literature review leads to the following hypothesis:      
 
H7: The high speed and broad scope of market oriented reforms in Poland contributed 
positively to bridging the gap in BO rates with the mature economies. 
 
3. DATA  
In this paper we use business ownership rates for 24 OECD countries, defined as the number 
of non-agricultural business owners in a country divided by the size of the labour force. 
Business ownership (self-employment) is defined as the total number of unincorporated and 
incorporated self-employed outside the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing industries, 
who carry out self-employment as their primary employment activity, see Van Stel (2005, p. 
108). Unpaid family workers are excluded. These data are taken from EIM’s COMPENDIA 
data base (version 2009.1).
2 In this data base, self-employment numbers as published in 
OECD Labour Force Statistics are corrected for measurement differences across countries 
and over time and thus harmonized. In particular, in OECD Labour Force Statistics owner-
managers of incorporated businesses (OMIBs) are counted as self-employed in some 
countries, and as employees in other countries. Also, the raw OECD data suffer from many 
trend breaks relating to changes in self-employment definitions over time. EIM has 
constructed a method to correct for these inconsistencies (see Van Stel, 2005). For an update 
of the harmonization methods and for detailed information regarding the specifics of the 




4.1. Trends in BO rates 1989-2008 – a comparative analysis 
To test our hypotheses we have conducted comparative analysis of trends in BO rates -both 
actual levels and dynamics of change- during the period 1989-2008. Taking into consideration 
the above-mentioned mix of economic, institutional and cultural factors affecting the levels 
and trends in business ownership rates, the countries originally included in the COMPENDIA 
data base (except for Iceland, Luxembourg and Japan) have been divided into four major 
country groups (see Wennekers et al., 2010): Mediterranean, Anglo-Saxon, Western European 
                                                 
2  COMPENDIA  is  an  acronym  for  COMParative  ENtrepreneurship  Data  for  International  Analysis.  See 
http://www.ondernemerschap.nl for the data and Van Stel (2005) for a justification of the harmonization methods. This 
database has been used and acknowledged widely (see, among other studies, Armour and Cumming, 2008, Carree et al., 2002, 
2007, Davis, 2008 (p. 54), Koellinger and Thurik, 2012, Nyström, 2008, and Parker, Congregado and Golpe, 2012).      
and Scandinavian. The fifth group consists of the four Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEE) which have recently been added to the COMPENDIA data base. 
 
Table 1 demonstrates remarkable developments in business ownership in the four Central and 
East European (CEE) transition economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak 
Republic) since 1989. Radical changes in the levels of business ownership during the period 
under study were combined with diversified patterns, as BO rates evolved over time.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
After 45 years of communist dominance, during which period private business was 
disallowed or tolerated only as a marginal addition to the state-ownership sector, and 
subsequently 20 years of transitioning from a centrally-planned to a market economy, the 
CEE countries were able to catch up with the mature Western economies in terms of the 
levels of BO rates. While in 1989 the average (weighted) BO rate for the area comprising the 
four CEE countries was less than one third of the COMPENDIA-23 average, by 2008 this gap 
had effectively been closed (Table 2; panel 1). At present BO rates in Hungary, Slovak 
Republic and Poland are quite similar to those of Western European countries, which are 
geographically and culturally close (Table 2; panel 2). The Czech Republic is a clear 
exemption; with a very high rate it fits better to the Anglo-Saxon group. Taking into account 
that very high BO rates in the Mediterranean countries are strongly affected by historic and 
cultural factors which are specific for this region, we may conclude that nowadays the CEE 
region as a whole fits very well within a general pattern of business ownership rates in Europe 
(Figure 2). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
The most surprising outcome of the developments taking place in the course of transition 
from the centrally-planned to a market economy system was that countries that lagged behind 
in business ownership at the early stage of the transition process, the Czech and Slovak 
republics, eventually emerged as the leaders in entrepreneurial activity, surpassing Hungary 
and Poland, which had a more sizeable private sector under communism (Figure 3). As 
discussed in greater detail in Subsection 2.3. above, due to severe restrictions under      
communism, at the outbreak of systemic transformation in 1989, the private business sector 
was practically non-existent in Czech and Slovak republics (then Czechoslovakia). Nowadays 
(2008), Slovak Republic surpassed United Kingdom as to the level of the BO rate, whereas 
Czech Republic emerged as a clear leader, lagging only behind two Mediterranean countries 
traditionally showing exceptionally high business ownership rates, namely Italy and Greece. 
An additional effect was that the levels of BO rates among CEE countries which were 
extremely differentiated at the beginning of the transition process, have gradually converged 
over time (Table 2; panels 3 and 4). 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
4.2. Actual vs “equilibrium” business ownership rates in the CEE countries 
In the statistical analysis conducted in the previous subsection we have investigated the 
convergence of BO rates in the CEE region with those achieved in other OECD countries 
during 1989 – 2008. In this section we investigate to what extent the four CEE countries, 
since 1989, have converged towards business ownership levels which are compatible with 
their levels of economic development. For each stage or level of economic development one 
can think of a ‘natural’ rate of business ownership expressing the relative importance of scale 
economies, the importance of the service sector and several other phenomena influencing the 
average scale of production (Wennekers et al., 2010).  
 
For this purpose we re-estimate (part of) the model by Carree et al. (2002, 2007). In 
particular, we re-estimate the ‘equilibrium’ relation between economic development and 
the business ownership rate. Using this relation we are able to describe the patterns of 
convergence  of  the  business  ownership  rate  towards  the  ‘equilibrium’  business 
ownership rate for the four CEE countries since 1989. For full details of the econometric 
analysis we refer to the Appendix to this paper. In this section we will focus on the 
implications for convergence. 
 
According to our estimation results the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership can be 
written  as 
1








E ,  where  YCAP  is  expressed  in  thousands  of  US 
dollars of price level 2000. Using this equilibrium relation, Tables 3a until 3d describe      
the convergence pattern of the (non-agricultural) business ownership rate for the four 
CEE countries.  
 
In  1989,  at  the  end  of  the  Communist  period,  business  ownership  (self-employment) 
levels in the four CEE countries were relatively low. In particular, business ownership 
levels  were  lower  than  could  be  expected  on  the  basis  of  their  level  of  economic 
development.  From  the  last  columns  we  can  see  that  convergence  has  clearly  taken 
place: the difference between the ‘equilibrium’ and actual business ownership rate has 
decreased since 1992 (and indeed since 1989). In fact, for Czech Republic the business 
ownership  is  even  higher  in  2008  than  could  be  expected  based  on  their  per  capita 
income level. Slovak Republic has just recently converged towards the equilibrium rate, 
while convergence in Hungary and Poland also occurs, but at a slower speed. Figure 4 
shows the actual and ‘equilibrium’ business ownership rates for the four CEE countries 
in 2008. As a point of reference, the United States is also included in the figure. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
5. DISCUSSION  
The results of the analysis contained in the preceding section lead to a general conclusion that 
the period of 45 years under communist rule, a system which ideologically and practically 
battled with entrepreneurial initiatives, did not have prolonged negative effect on the private 
business sector in the CEE region. What mattered most were the institutional and cultural 
roots or “civilization fundamentals”. Based on those fundamentals, the CEE countries were 
able, within the relatively short period of transition, to rebuild the entrepreneurial sector.  
 
This is particularly reflected in the gradual convergence of the BO rates in the CEE region 
towards the OECD (COMPENDIA-23) average (Table 2; panel 1): from 32.5% in 1989 to 
98.7% in 2008. This confirms Hypothesis 1: As all four countries under study belonged 
historically to the Western Christendom, this facilitated rapid catching-up of BO rates with 
those prevailing in the mature market economies while at the same time downplaying the role 
of communist heritage. 
      
In Hypothesis 2 we speculated that: Due to historic and cultural links with some Western 
European countries, BO rates prevailing in these countries form a “historic benchmark” to 
which CEE region tended to converge. Such trend is clearly visible for Hungary and Poland 
(Table 2; panel 2), whereas in the case of the Slovak and Czech republics their “historical 
benchmark” seem to be the Anglo-Saxon countries. Such developments in the Czech Republic 
can be explained by the strength of additional factors, namely its most intensive, among CEE 
countries, historic ties with the Western civilization. In Hypothesis 3 we speculated that such 
“ historic roots provided most favorable environment for catching up with respect to BO 
rates”. Parallel to that was a relative high rate of socio-economic development at the 
beginning of the transition period (Figure 1), compared to other CEE countries under study 
which, as expected in Hypothesis 6, also “contributed positively to bridging the gap in BO 
rates with the mature economies”. Indeed, the speed of catching up was extremely fast. As 
exemplified by the data contained in Table 2, Czech Republic has surpassed, in terms of BO 
rate, the COMPENDIA-23 average already in 1996, reaching in 2008 a level 43% higher than 
the said average. 
 
As to the developments in the Slovak Republic, one shall also bear in mind that Czech and 
Slovak republics have a tradition of functioning as a two-nation state since 1918 and were 
separated only in 1993. Historically being less advanced, the Slovak Republic could benefit 
from continuing strong economic, cultural and institutional ties with the Czech Republic, 
resulting in similar approaches to rebuilding the private business sector after transition to a 
market economy system. Based on that we consider Hypotheses 2, 3 and 6 as confirmed. 
 
Regarding the impact of past experiences with the private business sector under communism 
we could distinguish between those countries having sizeable private sector at the outbreak of 
systemic transition (Hungary and Poland) and countries where the private sector was 
practically non-existent (Czech Republic and Slovak Republic). In Hypothesis 4 we 
speculated: Experiences with entrepreneurship under the communist regime in Hungary and 
Poland contributed to the accelerated growth of BO rates after transition. We have pointed 
out , however, that the positive impact of such experiences can be limited due to the strong 
embeddedness in the past institutional environment.  
 
The results of empirical analysis presented in the preceding Section (Table 1 and Figure 3) 
point out to the complex nature of such a relationship. Clearly, the communist past helped in      
the rapid expansion of the small business sector in Hungary and Poland in the early 1990s. 
Later on we could note a saturation (Poland) or even decline of BO rates (Hungary). On the 
one hand this was the result of many of the new business establishments closing after a short 
period, due to a lack of experience of their owners, inadequate financing, uncertain fiscal 
regulations, etc. At the same time incumbent private firms could not adjust to the market 
economy system and ceased operations, despite being successful under communism. Thus our 
analysis seem to confirm the findings from the extant literature, referred to in sub-section 2.3, 
that the entrepreneurial experiences accumulated under communism were not much useful for 
growth of the private business sector after transition to a market economy system. Based on 
the above we may conclude that Hypothesis 4 was partially confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 5 read: The narrowing gap as to the level of GDP per capita between mature 
market economies and CEE countries during 1989-2008 contributed to the convergence of 
BO rates between these two groups of countries. The fast increase in GDP per capita of the 
CEE countries implied moving from an efficiency-driven type of economy towards an 
innovation-driven type of economy, where entrepreneurial opportunities are more abundant, 
especially in a transition context (Stam and Van Stel, 2011). In this sense, the catching-up 
process in terms of economic development of the CEE countries contributed to a catching-up 
process also in terms of business ownership. Moreover, since in the long run countries tend to 
follow an ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership which is declining with economic 
development
3, the fast increase in GDP per capita for the CEE countries implied that their 
equilibrium BO rates were declining, contributing to a convergence process between the 
actual and the equilibrium BO rates for the CEE countries (see Section 4.2). We conclude that 
Hypothesis 5 is confirmed. 
 
With respect to Hypothesis 7, the high speed and broad scope of market oriented reforms in 
Poland contributed positively to bridging the gap in BO rates with the mature economies, the 
empirical analysis leads to some observations which are similar to those related to Hypothesis 
5. The substantial impact of radical economic reforms introduced in Poland on BO rates could 
be noted during 1989-1991. The “shock therapy” involving major privatizations and closures 
of many state-owned companies meant the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs deemed 
                                                 
3 Note  that,  whereas  the  relation  between  economic  development  and  business  ownership  (a  measure  of  incumbent 
entrepreneurship) is mostly found to be L-shaped, the relation between economic development and measures of new-firm 
entrepreneurship such as GEM’s TEA rate, is often found to be U-shaped (see e.g. Kelley, Bosma and Amorós, 2011). The 
high exit rates in modern economies form the most likely explanation for these different patterns.      
secure under the previous regime. In addition, the “winds of history” spirit (Cieslik and 
Kaciak, 2009a) inspired many people to start their own business. Later on, the impact of 
radical reforms seemed to vanish, which strengthens some doubts on this subject, raised in the 
extant literature (Fogel and Zapalska, 2001) and discussed in subsection 2.5. We may 
therefore conclude that Hypothesis 7 is partially confirmed. 
 
Summing up the discussion of the results of the empirical analysis in relation to the 
hypotheses developed in Section 2 we are able to confirm 5 out of 7 hypotheses. Two 
remaining hypotheses are partially confirmed. It is interesting to note that the two hypotheses 
being only partially confirmed relate to the developments under communism and during the 
20 years of transition. This reinforces the key conclusion derived from our analysis that what 
mattered most with respect to business ownership rates were the historic economic, 
institutional and cultural ties with the Western world (the “civilization fundamentals”). 
 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
6.1. Policy implications  
 
As “latecomers”, the CEE countries are in a privileged position as they may study trends in 
the mature economies and assess the effectiveness of various policy measures aimed at 
enhancing entrepreneurship. The accumulated body of policy-oriented entrepreneurship 
research can be helpful in this respect, as well. Since the current entrepreneurship policy 
debate lacks a sound empirical background, inclusion of these CEE countries in the 
harmonized COMPENDIA data base is very important as it provides benchmark BO rates, 
useful for shaping entrepreneurship policies.  
Based on the research presented in this paper we point out some conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
One of the key policy issues, to be addressed by the CEE policymakers, is whether they shall 
strive for further increasing the general level of business ownership, which is in fact their 
most often declared policy statement. Here we shall refer to the concept of the “optimal” 
business ownership rate (in terms of achieving the highest GDP levels), estimated by Van 
Praag and Van Stel (2010) as being in the range of 12.5%. Except for the Czech Republic, the 
remaining CEE countries achieved lower than “optimal” business ownership rates, so far.      
However, Van Praag and Van Stel find the optimal rate to decrease with higher participation 
levels in tertiary education.
4 This is generally a strongpoint of the CEE region, particularly of 
Poland, which scholarization index ranks very high among European countries (Central 
Statistical Office, 2010, p. 27).  
 
Assuming that the CEE countries are quite close to or above their “optimal” business 
ownership rates, further increases of the total number of business establishments may not be 
justified. Alternatively, these countries should rather focus on the ambitious segments of 
entrepreneurship in view of their potential contribution to the growth of GDP and 
employment (Stam and Van Stel, 2011). Here we have in mind fast-growing, knowledge-
based or innovation-driven firms, creative industries, exporters, etc. In fact, some interesting 
trends have already become noticeable. We refer to Cieslik and Kaciak (2009b), who 
demonstrate a significantly higher proportion of high-growth firms and gazelles among Polish 
manufacturing SMEs, as compared to other OECD member countries (OECD, 2009).  
While improving the general conditions for entrepreneurship development, CEE countries 
should concentrate on the measures that reinforce positive effects of “civilization 
fundamentals” and downplaying the role of communist heritage. This includes, inter alia, 
promoting good practices regarding business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
While shaping specific instruments and policy measures, due to historic ties, the accumulated 
experiences of Western European countries seem to be particularly relevant. 
 
6.2. Limitations and future research directions 
The recent inclusion of the four CEE countries in the COMPENDIA data base shall be seen as 
a first step in the harmonization efforts regarding BO rates in transition economies. In view of 
the distinct characteristics of their statistical systems, more work is required to make sure that 
the differences as to the levels of the BO rates are not affected by methodological 
inconsistencies. 
 
A major limitation of our study stems from the fact that it focuses on quantitative aspects of 
entrepreneurship development. To offer a more meaningful contribution, relevant for 
entrepreneurs and policymakers, additional research on the qualitative dimensions of 
entrepreneurship development in transition economies will be necessary. The analysis based 
                                                 
4 Since their education implies a bigger span of control, higher-educated entrepreneurs optimize their profits by running 
larger firms – implying a lower number of business owners at the macro level.      
on secondary self-employment data shall not be seen as a substitute of research based on case 
studies, in depth interviews or questionnaire surveys. Just the opposite, having access to 
reliable, harmonized business ownership data enables triangulation of results obtained from 
studies using other methods. 
 
Regarding these qualitative dimensions, we need to explore in greater detail the distribution of 
entrepreneurial activity by major categories: the size of informal versus formal 
entrepreneurship and the share of marginal-scale entrepreneurial engagements, including 
those for which the business is a secondary activity, dependent self-employment and those 
using commission and task contracts without registering the business. The distribution 
between the solo-entrepreneurs and employers in each country is worth considering as well. 
As demonstrated by a more detailed research on data availability in Poland (Van Stel, Cieslik 
and Hartog, 2010), OECD labour force survey data (LFS) on which base business ownership 
is measured in COMPENDIA, can be broken down to distinguish not only between employers 
and solo-entrepreneurs but also between those who engage in business as an auxiliary activity 
next to, e.g., work under an employment contract. 
 
In our research we investigated non-agricultural BO rates at the country level. A deeper 
analysis of spatial variations of such rates within each country might be useful for identifying 
differences between highly developed and backward regions. To date, a lack of harmonized 
business ownership data at the regional level hampers such analysis. 
 
An obvious limitation results from the concentration of our research on four CEE countries 
with very similar historic and cultural traditions and relatively short (45 years) periods of 
communist rule. Thus extension of the analysis to other members of the former Soviet Bloc, 
following earlier work by Smallbone and Welter (2009), is highly recommended. In the case 
of such countries like Belarus, Russia and Ukraine we may expect a different picture as the 
key factors affecting entrepreneurship differ significantly from those observed in the four 
countries under study: the “civilization fundamentals”, experience with entrepreneurship 
under communism, the level of socio-economic development and the speed of implementation 
of market-oriented reforms. On top of that, those countries experienced communist rule over 
70 years. This can be seen as a minor difference with 45 years experienced by the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. It meant, however, that three, rather than 
two generations of people could develop a “homo sovieticus” mindset with potentially      
negative effects as to the initiatives to start and run own businesses. Another group of 
countries worth studying are the Baltic States. Here one can expect similar patterns as to the 
BO rates, compared to those identified in the four CEE countries under study. In general, 
broadening the scope by including countries representing different levels of economic and 
cultural development would greatly enhance the prospects for a high-quality research on the 
trends in entrepreneurial activity in a transition environment. 
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The main equation in the model by Carree et al. (2002, 2007) explains changes in the 
rate of business ownership (self-employment) from an error-correction process towards 
‘equilibrium’  or  ‘natural’  business  ownership  rates.  A  second  equation  acts  as  a 
definition and describes the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership as a function of 
economic  development.  Equation  (1)  relates  the  change  in  the  rate  of  business 
ownership  it E  to the extent in which this rate deviates from the ‘equilibrium’ rate 
*
it E , to 
which the unemployment rate  it U  deviates from the sample average unemployment rate 
and to which the labour income share  it LIQ  deviates from the sample average income 
share. Equation (2) describes the ‘equilibrium’ relationship between business ownership 
rates and economic development ( it YCAP ) as either U-shaped (2a) or L-shaped (2b). In 
the quadratic form, entrepreneurship declines with per capita income up till a minimum 
(when  it YCAP  equals  γ β 2 / − )  after  which  entrepreneurship  increases  with  per  capita 
income.  In  the  inverse  function,  entrepreneurship  gradually  declines  towards  an 
asymptotic minimum value (of  β α − ).  In  the first equation  the  following  notation is 
used:  4 4 − − = ∆ t t t X X X . The model reads as follows: 
 
(1)    ( ) ( ) ( ) it ITA ITA t i t i t i t i it D b LIQ LIQ b U U b E E b E 1 6 , 3 6 , 2 4 ,
*















E β α   , 
 
where 
E:    number of business owners per labour force, 
E*:    ‘equilibrium’ number of business owners per labour force, 
YCAP:   per capita GDP in thousands of purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 2000 
prices, 
U, U :   unemployment rate and sample average, respectively, 
LIQ, LIQ :  labour income share and sample average, respectively, 
DITA:    dummy variable with value 1 for Italy, and 0 for other countries, 
1 ε :    disturbance term 
i, t:    indices for country and year, respectively. 
 
The rationale of the model 
The variable to be explained in equation (1) is the growth in the number of business 
owners per labour force in a four-year period. The parameter b1 reflects the speed of an 
error  correction  mechanism  between  the  ‘equilibrium’  and  the  actual  rate  of  self-
employment at the start of the period and is expected to have a positive sign. As control 
variables, unemployment and the labour income share are included. Unemployment is 
                                                 
5 Apart from some minor adjustments, the description of the model, variables and data sources is taken over from Carree et al. 
(2007).      
expected to act as a push factor for self-employment and its expected sign is positive. 
The labour income share is an (inverse) proxy for business profitability and its expected 
sign is negative. Finally, we follow Carree et al. (2002) incorporating a dummy for Italy. 
Italy, and Northern Italy in particular, is exceptional in the sense that a relatively high 
value of GDP per capita is combined with a high and rising self-employment rate. The 
model is estimated by substituting the definition (2a) or (2b) into equation (1): 
 
(3a)  it ITA ITA t i t i t i t i t i it D b YCAP a YCAP a LIQ b U b E b a E 1
2
4 , 5 4 , 4 6 , 3 6 , 2 4 , 1 0 4 ε + + + + + + − = ∆ − − − − −  
 
(3b)  it ITA ITA
it
it
t i t i t i it D b
YCAP
YCAP
a LIQ b U b E b a E 1
4
4
4 6 , 3 6 , 2 4 , 1 0 4 1
ε + +
+
+ + + − = ∆
−
−
− − −   . 
 
For this paper we are mainly interested in the parameter estimates of α , β  and γ  and 
these are calculated as a reparametrisation of the parameters in (3a) and (3b): 
 
(4a)  1 5 1 4 1 3 2 0 b / a ˆ b / a ˆ b / ) LIQ b U b a ( ˆ = = + + = γ β α   , 
 
(4b)  ) /( ˆ / ) ( ˆ 1 4 1 3 2 0 b a b LIQ b U b a − = + + = β α   . 
 
Using these parameter estimates, variable E* can be computed (see equation 2). 
 
Variables and data sources 
E: Business ownership or self-employment is defined as the number of business owners 
(in all sectors excluding the agricultural sector), expressed as a fraction of the labour 
force.  Business  owners  include  unincorporated  and  incorporated  self-employed 
individuals but exclude unpaid family workers. Data on business ownership are taken 
from  EIM’s  COMPENDIA  data  base  (available  through  www.eim.net).  In 
COMPENDIA numbers of self-employed reported in OECD Labour Force Statistics are 
harmonized across  countries  and  over time. For the model  estimations in the  present 
paper, version 2008.1 of the COMPENDIA data base is used. See van Stel (2005) for an 
account of how an earlier version of this data set is put together. Data on total labour 
force are from OECD Labour Force Statistics; 
 
YCAP:  Gross  domestic  product  per  capita.  The  variables  gross  domestic  product  and 
total  population  are  taken  from  OECD  National  Accounts  and  OECD  Labour  Force 
Statistics,  respectively.  GDP  (in  thousands  of  US  $)  is  measured  in  constant  prices. 
Furthermore, purchasing power parities of 2000 are used to make the monetary units 
comparable between countries; 
 
U: Unemployment rate. It is measured as the number of unemployed as a fraction of the 
total  labour  force.  The  labour  force  consists  of  employees,  self-employed  persons, 
unpaid family workers, people employed by the armed forces and unemployed persons. 
The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic Indicators; 
 
LIQ: Labour income share. It is defined as the share of labour income (including the 
“calculated”  compensation  of  the  self-employed  for  their  labour  contribution)  in  the 
gross  national  income.  Total  compensation  of  employees  is  multiplied  by  (total 
employment/number of employees) to correct for the imputed wage income for the self-     
employed persons. Next, the number obtained is divided by total income (compensation 
of employees plus gross operating surplus and gross mixed income). The data of these 
variables are from OECD National Accounts. 
 
Estimation results 
Following Carree et al. (2002, 2007) we estimate the model using weighted least squares 
(with population as the weight factor). Instead of the 23 OECD countries originally used 
by Carree et al., we now use data of 27 OECD countries to estimate the model, where 
the four CEE countries have been newly added to the data base.
6 For the 23 original 
countries  we  use  data for  the  years 1996, 2000, 2004  and 2008.
7 However,  since the 
early years after the collapse of Communism cannot be considered representative for the 
relation between economic development and self-employment in the four CEE countries 
(as self-employment was artificially low), we only use the last two years of data (i.e., 
2004 and 2008) for these four countries. Our sample then consists of 100 observations. 
The results are presented in Table 4. 
                                                 
6 The 23 OECD countries originally used by Carree et al. comprise of the former EU-15, together with Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
7 Due to the four year lag in the model, the ‘equilibrium’ relation between self-employment and economic development is 
actually estimated using data for the years 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004.      
 
Table 4: Estimation results 
  Quadratic ‘equilibrium 
rate’: equation (2a) 
Inverse ‘equilibrium 
rate’: equation (2b) 
Equations (3a) and (3b), dependent variable: 4-year growth of business ownership rate 
 






















a5  per capita GDP  -2.54
E-06 
(0.2)   
















minimum  -   
asymptote    0.048 
R
2
adj  0.232  0.221 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 
0.01 level. The number of observations is 100. 
 
 
Since the Inverse model seems to perform somewhat better, we will use this model in 
the paper. According to our estimation results the ‘equilibrium’ rate of self-employment 
can then be written as 
1








E , where YCAP is expressed in thousands 
of US dollars of price level 2000. 
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Table 1. Non-agricultural business ownership rates in selected OECD countries, 1989-2008. 
Country  1989  1996  2002  2008 
Greece  0.188  0.197  0.190  0.198 
Italy  0.198  0.208  0.207  0.204 
Portugal  0.134  0.167  0.147  0.131 
Spain  0.123  0.130  0.127  0.131 
Mediterranean countries  0.166  0.177  0.172  0.168 
         
Australia  0.158  0.159  0.158  0.145 
Canada  0.105  0.128  0.124  0.120 
Ireland  0.102  0.112  0.113  0.116 
New Zealand  0.120  0.137  0.135  0.128 
United Kingdom  0.113  0.112  0.104  0.115 
USA  0.108  0.106  0.098  0.096 
Anglo-Saxon countries  0.111  0.111  0.104  0.104 
         
Austria  0.072  0.074  0.087  0.089 
Belgium  0.111  0.119  0.115  0.111 
France  0.099  0.086  0.079  0.086 
Germany  0.071  0.082  0.086  0.097 
The Netherlands  0.080  0.098  0.103  0.119 
Switzerland  0.069  0.077  0.074  0.068 
Western European countries  0.084  0.086  0.086  0.095 
         
Denmark  0.060  0.064  0.067  0.070 
Finland  0.081  0.080  0.079  0.088 
Norway  0.081  0.071  0.065  0.084 
Sweden  0.069  0.081  0.081  0.087 
Scandinavian countries  0.071  0.075  0.074  0.083 
         
Czech Republic  0.002  0.112  0.146  0.152 
Hungary  0.061  0.120  0.103  0.097 
Poland  0.046  0.077  0.077  0.091 
Slovak Republic  0.001  0.053  0.065  0.117 
Central and Eastern European 
countries  0.037  0.087  0.092  0.105 
         
COMPENDIA-23  0.113  0.111  0.106  0.107 
Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base. 
Note: Business ownership rates for the country groups are weighted averages of the underlying countries. 
      
 
Table 2. Comparative analysis of trends in BO rates during 1989 – 2008. 
No.  Description  1989  1996  2002  2008 
 
1.  Average BO rates in the CEE countries as % of 
average COMPENDIA-23, of which: 
- Czech Republic 
- Hungary 
- Poland  


























2.  Average BO rates in the CEE countries as % of 
average Western European group, of which: 
- Czech Republic 
- Hungary 
- Poland  


























3.  Lowest BO rate as % of the highest BO rate 
within the CEE country group 
1.3  44.5  44.8  59.6 
 
4.  BO rates in individual CEE countries as % of the 
average BO rate for the CEE group as a whole 
- Czech Republic 
- Hungary 
- Poland  

























Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base. 
Note: Business ownership rates for the country groups are weighted averages of the underlying countries 
(see Table 1). 
      
 
Table 3a: Actual and ‘equilibrium’ self-employment rates, Czech Republic 
Year  Per capita 
income in 











1989  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  0.002  N.A. 
1992  12798  N.A.  0.145  0.069  0.076 
1996  14429  0.127  0.134  0.112  0.022 
2000  14995  0.039  0.131  0.133  -0.002 
2004  17054  0.137  0.122  0.151  -0.030 
2008  20609  0.208  0.110  0.152  -0.043 







Table 3b: Actual and ‘equilibrium’ self-employment rates, Hungary 
Year  Per capita 
income in 











1989  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  0.061  N.A. 
1992  9477  N.A.  0.175  0.085  0.091 
1996  10001  0.055  0.169  0.120  0.049 
2000  12114  0.211  0.150  0.110  0.040 
2004  14549  0.201  0.134  0.112  0.021 
2008  16022  0.101  0.126  0.097  0.029 
Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base, and own calculations. 
      
 
Table 3c: Actual and ‘equilibrium’ self-employment rates, Poland 
Year  Per capita 
income in 











1989  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  0.046  N.A. 
1992  6966  N.A.  0.215  0.068  0.148 
1996  8619  0.237  0.186  0.077  0.109 
2000  10568  0.226  0.163  0.080  0.083 
2004  11896  0.126  0.151  0.078  0.073 
2008  14706  0.236  0.133  0.091  0.042 







Table 3d: Actual and ‘equilibrium’ self-employment rates, Slovak Republic 
Year  Per capita 
income in 











1989  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  0.001  N.A. 
1992  8253  N.A.  0.192  0.041  0.151 
1996  9984  0.210  0.169  0.053  0.116 
2000  10972  0.099  0.159  0.060  0.099 
2004  13115  0.195  0.142  0.091  0.051 
2008  17721  0.351  0.119  0.117  0.002 
Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base, and own calculations. 
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Czech Republic Hungary Poland
Slovak Republic COMPENDIA-23
 
Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base, based on OECD National Accounts and OECD Labour Force 
Statistics. 
Note: GDP per capita is expressed in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 2000 prices. The COMPENDIA-23 





















































































































Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base.      
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Source: EIM, COMPENDIA 2009.1 data base, and own calculations.      
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